“GPS blackmail” possible, may have already happened. Leadership needed.
In a paper released on July 18, the National Security Space Association (NSSA) warns that America is over-dependent on GPS, has no real alternatives, and is far behind China and Russia. Both of those nations have terrestrial backups for space-based navigation and timing signals. Because GPS and other satellite navigation signals are so easily interrupted and imitated, this puts the U.S. at great risk.
"Merely the threat of disrupting GPS services might be enough to impact U.S. national security and foreign policy.” — Mark Berkowitz
This “navigation warfare asymmetry” makes it easy for adversaries to interfere with American weapons systems, as is happening in Ukraine. It also threatens critical infrastructure in the homeland.
"Russia and China are acquiring or operating various cyber, electronic warfare (EW), kinetic energy, directed energy, nuclear, and orbital ASAT or counterspace weapons systems. Iran and North Korea operate cyber, EW, and missile capabilities which can interfere with space assets and operations. All four nations have conducted Navwar operations against GPS."
The U.S. is so dependent on GPS signals, according to the paper, just the threat of disruption could be enough to affect our policies and actions.
This may have already happened. Prior to invading Ukraine, Russia destroyed one of its old satellites with a ground-based missile. It then threatened to destroy all of America’s GPS satellites if NATO interfered in the region. There is no way of knowing the impact this has had on the U.S. or NATO response.
The U.S. government has been aware of this problem for at least two decades. Presidents and Congress have mandated a series of remedies, though no action has been taken.
The paper says “Focused leadership, properly empowered and resourced, is essential…” to making the nation safe and regaining American leadership in the field.
The paper “America’s Asymmetric Vulnerability to Navigation Warfare: Leadership and Strategic Direction Needed to Mitigate Significant Threats” was sponsored by the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation and can be found here.
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