Abstract
Currently, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” has joined forces with the Navy's “Shandong” carrier of the Southern Theater Command in southern China. This is also the first time that the Chinese Navy's aircraft carrier “Liaoning” “ and the ‘Shandong’ have appeared in the same setting at the Dachang Shipbuilding Group, and also for the first time, both carriers have appeared in a joint combat position. The two aircraft carriers coordinated in the South China Sea implementing the plan to create the PLAN's first “dual-carrier battle group”. As the sensitive nodes approach, the situation in the Southeast is likely to worsen gradually. The basic tactical application would be to advance an aircraft carrier in the direction of the western Pacific and push the Chinese military cordon as far ahead as possible. One aircraft carrier can control hundreds of kilometers of sea; two can control thousands. During this sensitive period, the simultaneous deployment of two aircraft carriers at sea could be a huge strategic deterrent against major Chinese combat targets and push “enemies” out of their theater of operations. This could be the reason why the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” suddenly rushed into the South China Sea. Chinese sources say that judging from the trajectory of the aircraft carrier "Liaoning", this time the Chinese Navy is paying more and more attention to the important position of Southeast Asia for its foreign strategy. In addition, since this year, Chinese ships continue to operate in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. Now the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" has also entered these seas. The analysis of the situation shows that the Philippines is increasingly becoming a Chinese garden. The same Chinese sources say that as long as the Philippines continues to jump, the probability of the Chinese Navy entering the internal waters of the Philippine Islands will become increasingly high, and next time it may be able to start directly flying carrier-based aircraft in places such as the Celebes Sea and the Sulu Sea.
by Nicola and Gabriele Iuvinale
Currently, the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” has joined forces with the Navy's “Shandong” carrier of the Southern Theater Command in southern China.
This is also the first time that the Chinese Navy's aircraft carrier “Liaoning” “ and the ‘Shandong’ have appeared in the same setting at the Dachang Shipbuilding Group, and also for the first time, both carriers have appeared in a joint combat position.
The two aircraft carriers coordinated in the South China Sea implementing the plan to create the PLAN's first “dual-carrier battle group”.
As the sensitive nodes approach, the situation in the Southeast is likely to worsen gradually. The basic tactical application would be to advance an aircraft carrier in the direction of the western Pacific and push the Chinese military cordon as far ahead as possible. One aircraft carrier can control hundreds of kilometers of sea; two can control thousands.
During this sensitive period, the simultaneous deployment of two aircraft carriers at sea could be a huge strategic deterrent against major Chinese combat targets and push “enemies” out of their theater of operations. This could be the reason why the aircraft carrier “Liaoning” suddenly rushed into the South China Sea.
In the first week of operations, a single Chinese aircraft carrier can make an average of 50 daily sorties of its fixed-wing embarked aircraft. After one week, it is estimated that the number will gradually drop to 30-40 sorties. With the average capacity of about 40 flights per day, a Chinese J-15 jet embarked on aircraft carriers can make nearly 2 sorties per day.
This average number of sorties per day is equivalent to that of F-14A aircraft embarked on U.S. Navy aircraft carriers; however, in terms of total sorties flown by Chinese aircraft carriers, it is equivalent to only half that of U.S. aircraft carriers.
Therefore, in the event of a hypothetical clash between Chinese and U.S. fleets, the combat effectiveness of a single Chinese Navy aircraft carrier (if ground support factors, such as early warning command and control aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, and anti-submarine air support, were not taken into account), is about half that of the “Nimitz” class aircraft carrier.
It is a relatively normal estimate that two Chinese aircraft carriers are equivalent to one U.S. “Nimitz” class carrier.
It is, therefore, quite obvious that China uses the “Nimitz” class aircraft carrier as its main reference point, because it is necessary to practice the organization of a dual-carrier battle group to ensure that, in any future clashes between rival fleets, Beijing can avoid falling into a disadvantageous situation.
At the same time, the formation of a dual-carrier battle group of the same model, with similar performance and similar equipment usage patterns will also greatly improve combat redundancy.
For example, if one aircraft carrier is damaged due to a malfunction in the takeoff and landing equipment of the embarked aircraft or is attacked by an enemy, the other aircraft carrier in the formation could quickly take over the command function while also taking into account the recovery of aircraft embarked on damaged aircraft carrier.
Therefore, the dual carrier battle group can also be said to be a kind of double insurance for carrier battle group operations.
However, when organizing the deployment of double carrier battle groups, what needs to be done is much more complicated.
For example, in terms of fleet formation, after two aircraft carriers are organized into a formation, how to organize the formation of the aircraft carriers, and how to ensure that the two aircraft carriers do not interfere with each other when organizing the take-off and landing of carrier-based aircraft, that the jets do not encroach on each other's flights, how to ensure that air defense and anti-submarine warfare cover the formations of two aircraft carriers?
After determining the battle formation of the double aircraft carrier formation, the formation of the corresponding escort ship must be exercised. If an aircraft carrier is equipped with two large cruisers and two destroyers for air defense, is it necessary to add the corresponding escort to those two aircraft carriers? How to deploy the battle formation for the escort ships added to the fleet?
In addition to the battle group formation that requires drills, other forms of dual carrier battle group combat also require more technical and tactical drills.
For example, when there are two aircraft carriers in the theater of operations at the same time, how to manage the electromagnetic spectrum and how to ensure that the TACAN navigation frequencies of the two aircraft carriers do not interfere with each other? How to manage the radio frequency signal dissipation of the two battle groups to prevent the enemy from finding out the location of the carrier battle group through the direction finder of the electronic interception system (ESM)?
How to organize anti-submarine warfare and air defense between two aircraft carriers? How are anti-aircraft fire zones and short-range anti-submarine warning curtains installed in a double-carrier formation and how do they work? When conducting air defense operations or anti-submarine warfare maneuvers, how can the two aircraft carriers and the entire escort fleet avoid mutual interference, how to avoid accidental attacks, etc.?
These are also issues that have not been addressed by the Chinese navy, the PLAN, before, and need to be verified.
The "Shandong" and "Liaoning" are now simultaneously deployed on Hainan Island; but will the two ships be well-equipped and equipped to be sent into joint combat in the future?
On the one hand, several years have passed since China entered the era of double or even triple aircraft carriers, but it has not yet concretely committed to operating a battle group with two aircraft carriers simultaneously.
Chinese sources say that judging from the trajectory of the aircraft carrier "Liaoning", this time the Chinese Navy is paying more and more attention to the important position of Southeast Asia for its foreign strategy.
In addition, since this year, Chinese ships continue to operate in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea. Now the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" has also entered these seas. The analysis of the situation shows that the Philippines is increasingly becoming a Chinese garden.
Chinese sources themselves claim that as long as the Philippines continues to jump, the probability of the Chinese navy entering the internal waters of the Philippine Islands will become increasingly high, and next time it may be able to start directly flying carrier-based aircraft in places like the Celebes Sea and the Sulu Sea.
In addition, from the analysis of the actions of the Chinese Navy's Liaoning carrier battle group, its battle group consisted of only two large Type 055 destroyers and two Type 052D air defense destroyers, but the Type 054A frigate, a regular member of the carrier formation, was missing.
Chinese military experts argue that it is obvious that the Type 054A frigate, as a ship responsible for short-range anti-submarine warning curtains and air defense combat ships, theoretically should not have been missing from this operation, but it did not appear in the formation. This may prove that, to a certain extent, the Type 054A frigate, due to its relatively low speed, is slow in implementing the occupation of the position during rapid maneuvers, which to a certain extent slows down the speed of action of the entire carrier battle group.
In any case, this time the aircraft carrier "Liaoning" went south to the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea, bringing the surprise arrival of the era of the Chinese Navy's "double carrier" strike group.
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