Abstract - Classified: military and strategic OSINT relevance
In September this year, China announced that it had carried out a test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile in the Pacific Ocean, the first officially reported in 44 years. According to what was communicated by the Chinese Ministry of Defense, the intercontinental ballistic missile, a DF-27 carrying a "fake" "nuclear" warhead, would have left the island of Hainan at 8.44 am Beijing time and would have fallen "exactly in the sea area chosen." The conventional and strategic strike capabilities of the new DF-27 ballistic missile will bring significant global strategic benefits to China. With DF-26 medium-range ballistic missiles, the PLA would be able to hit the main targets in the second island chain, but it would not solve the problem of being able to attack targets in the third island chain. This third chain includes the Aleutian Islands and even Alaska in the north, the Hawaiian Islands in the center, northern Australia in the south, and even the British Territory up to the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. This gap would be filled by the DF-27 intercontinental ballistic missile. Its targets, already defined, are: the launch site of the US Army GBI interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska, the military port of the US Pacific Fleet in Honolulu, Hawaii, Australia, the island of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. This would be equivalent, for Beijing's strategists, to “deny the existence of US maritime hegemony.” Unlike the large intercontinental ballistic missiles already in China's possession, small missiles like the DF-27 do not necessarily need to be used at the launch site. They can maneuver fully across country, thus maximizing their battlefield survivability. “Its existence will not only reshape China's nuclear strategy to a certain extent, but also may have a subversive impact on the global maritime power of Western countries led by the United States, and even dispel the influence of the United States, a powerful country on the seas , and on the oceans”. For this reason, Western military intelligence services have begun to show assiduous interest in it since the test launch of the missile by the Chinese Missile Force.
by Nicola e Gabriele Iuvinale
The DF-27 land-based ballistic missile has two key performance elements.
The first is the ability to hit targets with conventional and precision warheads at very long range. It can pose a huge threat to mobile targets at sea or moored targets at a relatively long distance. It is a "strategically key" weapon for China, capable of changing the course of a naval war and has a "very important impact" on the global maritime domains of the United States.
The second is the near-intercontinental strategic attack capability. It can carry not only conventional warheads, but also nuclear warheads and its range of action is wider than that of the DF-26 ballistic missile, another ballistic missile for medium-range conventional and nuclear strategic attacks, also available to the section DF-26 of the PLA Rocket Force.
What the conventional strike capabilities and strategic strike capabilities of the DF-27 missile (ballistic missile) mean respectively, and what strategic advantages it will bring to China.
Conventional attack capability
Judging by the conventional strike capabilities of the DF-27 ballistic missile, Chinese military experts believe it will bring two indisputable significant benefits for Beijing.
In terms of tactical advantages, it will give the military of the PLA, the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the ability to attack tactical targets on the left and right sides of the third island chain.
The tactical deployment of the Chinese Missile Force on the eastern strategic front is based on the "three levels".
The short- and medium-range tactical missiles are intended to hit tactical targets on the first island chain (first tier), and the medium- and long-range ones target tactical targets on the second island chain (second tier).
The former include the well-known DF-11 and DF-15 series, which have obviously been upgraded to the DF-16 and DF-17 series, while the latter include the DF-21 series, now upgraded to the DF-26 series. After the PLA completes the deployment of the Rocket Force's regular equipment systems, it will have the potential to cause severe damage to multiple nodes and tactical targets across the planet (third tier).
However, the “third level”—the ability to actually pose a threat to targets on what the Chinese call the “third island chain”—has long been missing from the Rocket Force. In a sense, not only the lack of the ability to use conventional guided strikes against targets in the third island chain, but also the very ability to use conventional guided missiles to threaten targets in the second island chain was essentially resolved after the equipping of the DF-26 to troops; the DF-26 is a medium-range intercontinental ballistic missile that can carry conventional and nuclear warheads. Their construction and deployment on the eastern front of the Chinese coast towards the island of Guam is already in full swing, on the direct order of Xi Jinping, also president of the Central Military Commission.
In any case, even if equipped with DF-26 ballistic missiles, the firepower range of the PLA missile force would be sufficient, according to their military experts, only to cover the main objectives of the second island chain, but would not solve the problem of the possibility of attacking targets in the third island chain.
This third island chain includes the Aleutian Islands and even Alaska in the north, the Hawaiian Islands in the center, northern Australia in the south, and even the British Territory as far as Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean.
Among them, key points that need to be hit are:
the US Army GBI interceptor launch site at Fort Greely in Alaska, which is more than 6,500 kilometers from Beijing;
the military port of the US Pacific Fleet in Honolulu, Hawaii, which is about 7,200 kilometers from Heilongjiang province in the northern part of China;
Australia; the mainland is about 5,000 kilometers from northern Guangdong;
Diego Garcia, the island in the Indian Ocean which hosts United States naval and air installations it is about 5,500 kilometers from northern Guangdong;
The Suez Canal, is about 4,500 kilometers from Kashgar, the important city in western China.
It is of fundamental strategic importance for China to develop new DF-27 ballistic missiles.
The strategic advantages for Chinese strategists
In terms of strategic advantages, the DF-27 ballistic missile offers great advantages to China.
“To some extent, it can actually have a subversive impact on US naval strategy. Imagine, when the US Navy maneuvers an aircraft carrier to slowly pass through the Suez Canal, or when the aircraft carrier is about to stop to take a break in Hawaii; we Chinese can use long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles to destroy them. This amounts to “denying the existence of US maritime hegemony.” The aircraft carrier has no chance of surviving at sea. So, as a maritime power country, how can the United States secure its maritime power? Is it possible to maintain the past sea power strategy based on gunboat diplomacy? This is now the most difficult issue for Western countries."
The DF-27 would appear to give the Chinese the chance “to disarm part of the U.S. Army's verification warfare capabilities by conventional means.” For them, it would be an absolutely asymmetric means of warfare in the verification war, with which Beijing would not run the risk of nuclear escalation because it would have achieved the strategic objective that in the past it could only have achieved through the theater of a nuclear war.
“This will have a major impact on the US military's nuclear strategy and nuclear policy.”
Strategic attack capability (nuclear attack)
The strategic strike (nuclear attack) capabilities of the DF-27 are optimistic for Chinese strategists.
The Chinese point of view is very clear: the DF-27 can be considered the equivalent of the MGM-134 "Pygmy" land-based strategic missile, or the 15Ж59 "Messenger" that the Soviet Union began to develop in the last period, before of its disintegration.
What it undertakes is not just the theatrical nuclear exchange mission that some think, i.e. hitting targets on the third island chain. Effectively, the DF-26 is more than sufficient for theater nuclear exchange missions and even strategic nuclear exchanges against targets in European countries. The existence of the DF-27 must have higher level equipment considerations.
American SBX early warning radar
Chinese strategic-military opinion is that the “strategic type” DF-27 is a missile that serves verification warfare and is used for global nuclear exchange operations.
At dinner it already has large strategic missiles such as DF-31AG and DF-41, as well as the DF-5B launched from land silos; why would it need small ICBMs like the DF-27? “Of course it is useful.” The mode of deployment and use of this small strategic ICBM, including its operational role in nuclear exchanges, are different from those of large ICBMs.
In terms of how they are deployed, large ICBMs, even if they use mobile launch vehicles, are often unable to truly “run” across country. "The overtaking ability, camouflage ability, safety and confidentiality of large multi-axle special vehicles must be taken into consideration."
But this small intercontinental ballistic missile is different: it is light and small in size. For example, the MAZ-7929 special vehicle used by the 15Ж59 missile developed by the Soviet Union is actually similar in size to the classic MAZ-543 special vehicle used by the "Scud" missile, which allows it to use asphalt roads or even simple dirt roads maneuver in a wide range. In addition, this type of small ICBM has simple camouflage and relatively good confidentiality. It can be disguised as a long-range rocket launcher and can be quickly oriented after being equipped with a laser gyroscopic inertial navigation system.
Land-based strategic missile MGM-134 "Pygmy"
Therefore, small ICBMs like the DF-27 do not need to use a similar method for a nuclear attack on the launch site. They can fully maneuver across country, thus maximizing their battlefield survivability.
This type of survivability under nuclear attack is even stronger than the Soviet rail-mobile ICBM or the Russian rail-mobile ICBM "Barguzin", which relied on the Trans-Siberian Railway to maneuver and threaten the United States.
Such intercontinental ballistic missiles with very high survivability, such as the DF-27, can take on the role of general purpose nuclear assault operations. For example, in the first round of the nuclear assault, they can take on the task of striking hard targets, such as missile silos and interceptor launch sites. In the nuclear counterattack, they can also take on the task of attacking social wealth.
It's just that this type of intercontinental ballistic missile with high survivability should be organized into a battle reserve, always ready to attack the opponent's military and strategic targets. They do not need to be like other ICBMs with relatively low survivability in a wave.
Therefore, some Chinese military strategists believe that the “DF-27 strategic type” can actually be considered a verification war equipment, reflecting changes in Beijing's nuclear strategy.
In general, if the DF-26 strategic missile is used for tactical strikes within the second island chain, and is also used partly for theater-level nuclear exchanges and for partial-level total nuclear exchanges, then the DF- 27 not only can attack the third island chain, but can tactically target the entire archipelago and even be used for all-out nuclear exchanges.
“Its existence will not only reshape China's nuclear strategy to a certain extent, but also may have a subversive impact on the global maritime power of Western countries led by the United States, and even dispel the influence of the United States, a powerful country on the sea , on the ocean”.
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